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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jeremy Hathaway appeals from the district court's denial of his oral I.C.R. 
35 motion to reduce his sentence following the court's revocation of his 
probation. He also challenges the Idaho Supreme Court's order denying his 
motion to augment the appellate record. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Early in the morning of January 19, 2008, Payette County police officer 
Dustin Derrick observed Hathaway and two other individuals running from the 
area of Jerry's Market in Payette. (5/23/08 PSl, 1 pp.1-2, 18.) Officer Derrick 
approached and spoke with the individuals, from whom he could smell the odor 
of alcoholic beverages. (Id.) 
During his contact with the individuals, Officer Derrick learned through 
dispatch that a truck that was parked beside Jerry's Market had been broken 
into. (5/23/08 PSI, pp.2, 18.) The owner of the truck had previously called 911, 
and reported that he observed three males break into the truck and then run 
away. (Id.) Officer Derrick called for the assistance of another officer who 
investigated the truck and observed evidence that the three individuals kicked out 
the truck's back window and then attempted to hotwire it. (5/23/08 PSI, pp.18-
19.) Officers placed Hathaway and the two other individuals under arrest and 
transported them to the police station. · (5/23/08 PSI, p.19.) There, Hathaway 
1 PSI page citations are numbered sequentially from the first page, including 
attachments. 
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admitted that he and the other two individuals had attempted to steal the truck. 
(Id.) A breathalyzer test revealed Hathaway's BAC to be .094. (Id.) 
The state charged Hathaway with aiding and abetting burglary and minor 
in possession of alcohol. (R., pp.30, 60-61.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Hathaway pied guilty to an amended charge of attempted burglary, and the state 
dismissed the minor in possession of alcohol charge. (R., pp.66-70; 5/6/08 Tr., 
p.4, L.12 - p.13, L.13.) The district court imposed a unified four-year sentence 
with one and one-half years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed 
Hathaway on probation for four years. (R., pp.94-103.) The court also granted 
Hathaway's probation officer the authority to request up to 270 discretionary jail 
days, and ordered Hathaway pay restitution for the damage to the victim's truck. 
(Id.) 
Over the next year and a half, the district court approved 13 probation 
department requests for the imposition of approximately 239 discretionary jail 
days. (R., pp.109-122.) These requests were based on allegations that 
Hathaway: failed to obtain employment, failed to complete required treatment, 
failed to report to and follow the directives of his probation officer, consumed 
alcohol, moved without permission, possessed marijuana, and obtained a new 
criminal charge for battering a fellow inmate while serving discretionary jail time. 
(R., pp.109-122, 143-144.) 
In March 2010, the state filed its first motion for probation violation. (R., 
pp.123-147.) Hathaway admitted violating his probation. (R., pp.155-156.) The 
district court revoked Hathaway's probation and imposed his original sentence, 
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but retained jurisdiction for six months. (R., pp.157-161.) At the conclusion of 
the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended Hathaway's 
sentence and placed him back on supervised probation. (R., pp.168-173.) 
Three months later, Hathaway failed to appear at a scheduled review 
hearing. (R., p.176.) Shortly thereafter, the state filed its second motion for 
probation violation. (R., pp.177-184.) The state alleged that Hathaway moved 
without permission, failed to seek and maintain employment, failed to complete 
required treatment, and failed to pay required fines, fees, and restitution. (Id.) 
Hathaway admitted violating his probation. (R., pp.196-197.) The district court 
revoked and reinstated Hathaway's probation. (R., pp.198-199.) 
Approximately 10 months later, Hathaway was arrested and charged with 
misdemeanor domestic battery and malicious injury to property following a 
confrontation with his girlfriend. (R., pp.201-202, 210-217.) Based on these 
charges, and Hathaway's continuing failure to pay required fines, fees, and 
restitution, the state filed its third motion for probation violation. (R., pp.202-217.) 
Hathaway pied guilty to domestic battery and subsequently admitted violating his 
probation in the attempted burglary case. (5/11/12 PSI, pp.2, 4; R., pp.222-225.) 
During the disposition hearing, Hathaway's counsel suggested several possible 
disposition outcomes to the district court, including revoking Hathaway's 
probation but converting his sentence to county jail time, and converting six 
months of Hathaway's determinate sentence to indeterminate time. (6/1/12 Tr., 
p.15, L.18 - p.16, L.22.) Instead, the district court revoked Hathaway's probation 
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and imposed the original unified four-year sentence with one and one-half years 
fixed. (R., p.231.) Hathaway timely appealed. (R., pp.237-239.) 
After the appellate record was settled, Hathaway filed a motion to suspend 
the briefing schedule and to augment the record with as-yet unprepared 
transcripts of the evidentiary/admission and disposition hearings associated with 
his first and second probation violation proceedings. (11/16/12 Motion.) The 
state filed an objection. (11/20/12 Objection.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied 




Hathaway states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Hathaway due 
process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to 
Augment with transcripts necessary for review of the issues 
on appeal? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Hathaway's oral Rule 35 motion requesting leniency? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Hathaway failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated 
his constitutional rights when it denied his motion to augment the appellate 
record? 
2. Has Hathaway failed to establish that the district court abused its 
discretion by executing his sentence without reduction upon its revocation 




Hathaway Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His 
Constitutional Rights When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate 
Record 
A. Introduction 
Hathaway contends that the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his motion to 
augment the appellate record with as-yet unprepared transcripts of court 
hearings associated with his first and second periods of supervised probation 
violated his due process, equal protection, and effective assistance of counsel 
rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-19.) However, application of the relevant law 
reveals that Hathaway has failed to establish any violation of his constitutional 
rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. Hathaway Has Shown No Violation Of His Due Process, Equal Protection 
Or Effective Assistance Of Counsel Rights 
A defendant in a criminal case has a due process right to "a record on 
appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged 
regarding the proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 
6 
472, 477 (2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. 
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms 
and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)); see also 
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). State 
v. Cornelison, _ Idaho_, _ P.3d _, 2013 WL 163523 (Idaho App., 
2013.) The state, however, "will not be required to expend its funds 
unnecessarily" to provide transcripts that "will not be germane to consideration of 
the appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 
123 (1996) (indigent appellant has right to "a transcript of relevant trial 
proceedings"). Rather, an indigent defendant is entitled, at state expense, to 
only those transcripts and portions of the record necessary to pursue the issues 
raised on appeal. Griffin, 351 U.S. 12; Lane, 372 U.S. 477. To show prejudice 
Hathaway "must present something more than gross speculation that the 
transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th 
Cir. 2002). 
In Morgan, the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected Morgan's contention that 
the Idaho Supreme Court violated his constitutional rights in denying his motion 
to augment the appellate record with transcripts of hearings associated with the 
first of his two probation violation proceedings. Morgan, 153 Idaho at _, 288 
P.3d at 837-839. At the outset, the Idaho Court of Appeals "disclaim[ed) any 
authority to review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision 
made on a motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of 
Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the 
7 
state or federal constitutions or other law." !st at_, 288 P.3d at 837. Such an 
undertaking, the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of Appeals 
entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly 
beyond the purview of this Court." kl_; see also Cornelison, 2013 WL at 2-3 
(rejecting Cornelison's challenge that I.AR. 108(a) granted the Idaho Court of 
Appeals the implicit authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his 
motion to augment the appellate record). 
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals did leave open the possibility of 
review of such motions in some circumstances. !st Such circumstances may 
occur, the Court indicated, where "the completed briefs have refined, clarified, or 
expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for 
additional records or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support 
a renewed motion." kl 
Should the Idaho Court of Appeals be assigned this case, it lacks the 
authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's order. In addition, Hathaway's 
Appellant's brief has failed to demonstrate the need for additional records and 
transcripts, and he has not presented any evidence to support a renewed motion 
to augment the record. Hathaway's argument in his Appellant's brief as to why 
the record should be augmented with the transcripts at issue constitute 
essentially the same arguments he presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in his 
motion - that the district court may have relied on statements or evidence from 
those hearings in making its subsequent sentencing decision. (Compare 
11 /16/12 Motion with Appellant's brief, pp.5-19.) 
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Hathaway acknowledges Morgan, but contends that "the Morgan Court's 
statement that Mr. Morgan could have filed a renewed motion to augment directly 
with the Court of Appeals [in order to demonstrate the need for additional records 
or transcripts] is contrary to the Appellate Rules [which permit parties to file 
appellate motions only with the Idaho Supreme Court."] (Appellant's brief, pp.13-
14, n.2.) However, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently rejected a nearly 
identical argument in Cornelison: 
We reject that interpretation of the rule because we 
recognize this to be contrary to the grant of authority in Idaho 
Appellate Rule 101. That rule provides in part, "The Idaho Appellate 
Rules shall apply to all proceedings in the Court of Appeals as well 
as the following rules." I.A.R. 101. By way of Rule 101, this Court 
also has authority to entertain motions to augment the record as 
provided by Rule 30 after the case has been assigned to this Court. 
Moreover, if we were to accept Cornelison's interpretation, it would 
result in a lack of authority of this Court to entertain any motions. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 32(c), applicable to the Court of Appeals via 
Rule 101, allows any other motions permitted under the rules, other 
than a motion to dismiss, to be made at any time, before or after 
the case is set for oral argument. By way of that authority, this 
Court routinely rules on motions such as motions for continuance, 
motions regarding briefing (including motions to join briefing, file 
supplemental briefing, exceed the page limits, revise a brief, 
request an extension of time to file a brief, or request permission to 
file a late brief), motions to expedite the appeal, motions to 
withdraw as counsel, motions for a stay of proceedings, motions to 
augment the record, renewed motions to augment the record, and 
motions to allow or to vacate oral argument. Under the Idaho 
Appellate Rules, we have the authority to review and rule on 
motions made by a party after the case has been assigned to this 
Court. 
In sum, we adhere to our conclusion in Morgan that 
reviewing the denial of a motion to augment the record by the 
Supreme Court is beyond the scope of our authority. If a party files 
9 
a renewed motion after the case assignment to this Court and 
presents new information or justification for the motion, we have the 
authority to rule on the motion. 
Cornelison, 2013 WL at 4.2 
Because the Idaho Court of Appeals lacks the authority to review, and, in 
effect, reverse a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, and because Hathaway 
has failed to file a renewed motion or provide any new evidence or clarification in 
his Appellant's brief regarding his request to augment the record, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals must decline, if it is assigned this case, to review the Idaho Supreme 
Court's denial of Hathaway's motion to augment the record. 
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Hathaway's constitutional 
claims, all of his arguments fail. Hathaway's appeal is timely only from the 
district court's June 7, 2012 "Judgment and Commitment on Probation Violation." 
(See R., pp.234-235, 237-239.) On appeal, Hathaway challenges only the 
district court's decision not to reduce his sentence upon the final revocation of his 
probation. (See generally Appellant's brief.) The existing appellate record 
includes transcripts of Hathaway's arraignment, admission, and disposition 
hearings associated with this final probation violation. (4/6/12 Tr.; 4/20/12 Tr.; 
6/1/12 Tr.) The record also includes transcripts of Hathaway's change and plea 
and sentencing hearings from the underlying attempted burglary case; court 
minutes from each of the hearings that were the subject of his motion to augment 
2 The Idaho Court of Appeals also noted that in addition to filing a renewed 
motion to augment the record, or expanding or clarifying his augmentation 
request in his appellant's brief, Cornelison also had the right to file a petition for 
review of its decision with the Supreme Court. Cornelison, 2013 WL at 2, n.2. 
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the record; two PSls; and the APSI conducted after the period of retained 
jurisdiction. (See generally R.; 5/6/08 Tr.; 10/17/08 Tr.; 5/23/08 PSI; 5/11/12 PSI; 
10/19/10 APSI.) 
Hathaway nevertheless contends this available information is inadequate 
for appellate review of his claims. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-19.) However, each of 
the hearings associated with Hathaway's transcript request occurred prior to his 
third period of probation. (11/16/12 Motion.) The district court did not have 
transcripts of these hearings at the time it elected to revoke Hathaway's 
probation and execute his sentence without reduction, and there is no indication 
that the district court actually relied on anything that was said at these prior 
hearings in making this sentencing determination. 
Hathaway appears to assert that State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 
P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009), which requires appellate review of the entire record of 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including the final revocation of probation, 
entitles him to transcripts of each of the hearings conducted throughout his 
criminal proceedings. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-13.) However, as explained in 
Morgan, such an interpretation of Hanington is too broad. Morgan, 153 Idaho at 
_, 288 P.3d at 838. The Court of Appeals clarified that although it "will not 
arbitrarily confine [itself] to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation ... that does not mean that a// proceedings in 
the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane." & (emphasis 
original). Rather, "[t]he focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial 
court's decision to revoke probation." kl Accordingly, the Court "will consider 
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the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of 
probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal." ~ 
Because all relevant information to the district court's decision not to reduce 
Hathaway's sentence upon revocation of his probation is already included in the 
record on appeal, Hathaway has failed to show any due process violation 
resulting from the Supreme Court's order denying his motion to augment the 
record. 
Additionally, Hathaway was afforded all the process he was due in 
relation to the preparation of the appellate record before the record was settled. 
As noted in Morgan, 'The parties to an appeal have twenty-eight days from the 
service of the record to request additions or corrections to the record, Idaho 
Appellate Rule 29(a)." ~ at _, 288 P.3d at 838-839. "[Hathaway] was 
afforded the opportunity to designate not only the standard clerk's record, but 
also additional records necessary for inclusion in the clerk's record on appeal. 
I.AR. 28 (a), (c)." ~ Therefore, "[Hathaway] was provided the process by which 
he could designate all documents in the record necessary for appeal .... " kl 
Although the appellate rules also "provide[] that a party may move the Supreme 
Court to add to the settled clerk's record, nothing therein creates a right to such 
augmentation." ~ For these reasons, the Idaho Court of Appeals has rejected 
the proposition that "the ability to designate records necessary for appellate 
review under I.AR. 28 [is] insufficient to afford due process." kl 
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Hathaway's equal protection argument also lacks merit. The Court in 
Morgan rejected the argument that equal protection mandates augmentation of 
all transcripts the appellant desires, stating: 
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency. 
Morgan was afforded the opportunity to designate not only the 
standard clerk's record, but also additional records necessary for 
inclusion in the clerk's record on appeal. He had time to review the 
record and make any objections, corrections, additions, or deletions 
prior to settling of the record, pursuant to I.AR. 29(a). Morgan's 
failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho Appellate Rules, and his 
failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts in his motion to 
augment the record, precluded him from including the first 
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's 
motion to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant, 
indigent or otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested. 
lg_. at_, 288 P.3d at 839. Hathaway's equal protection claim fails for the same 
reasons. 
Finally, the Court in Morgan also rejected the assertion that the denial of a 
motion to augment the record on appeal results in the deprivation of the effective 
assistance of counsel. lg_. Hathaway, like Morgan, "has failed to demonstrate 
how effective assistance of counsel is not possible without the requested 
transcripts." kl 
The appellate record in this case is more than adequate to review 
Hathaway's claims that the district court abused its discretion by declining to 
reduce his sentence following the revocation of his probation. In addition, 
Hathaway has failed to show any violations of his equal protection and ineffective 
assistance of counsel rights. He has therefore failed to show that the Idaho 
Supreme Court violated his constitutional rights by denying his motion to 
augment the appellate record 
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11. 
Hathaway Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Executing His Sentence Without Reduction Upon Its Revocation Of His Third 
Period Of Probation 
A. Introduction 
Hathaway contends that the district court abused its discretion by 
declining his request to reduce his sentence upon its revocation of his probation. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.) Hathaway has failed to establish an abuse of 
discretion because the record supports the disrict court's sentencing decision. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to reduce an underlying sentence upon the 
revocation of probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hanington, 148 
Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. 
C. The District Court Acted Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original 
sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 
35. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. (citing State v. Beckett, 122 
Idaho 324, 326, 834 P .2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 
976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A court's decision not to reduce a 
sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established 
standards governing whether a sentence is excessive. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 
28, 218 P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant to "establish that, under 
any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the 
objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 
14 
P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 
99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The reviewing court "will examine 
the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment," 
i.e., "facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." Hanington, 
148 Idaho at 29, 218 P.3d at 8. 
In this case, the district court's decision to reduce Hathaway's sentence 
upon its revocation of his probation was reasonable in light of Hathaway's 
continuous failure to abide by the terms of his supervision despite multiple 
opportunities. Hathaway had the benefit and opportunity of three separate 
periods of probation, but violated his probation in all three instances. (R., 
pp.155-156; 196-197; pp.222-225.) He also had the opportunity to participate in 
the retained jurisdiction program. (See generally APSI.) 
Hathaway continued to commit crimes while he was on probation. In the 
time since Hathaway entered his guilty plea in the underlying attempted burglary 
case, Hathaway was charged and convicted of two counts of burglary (in 
Oregon), possession of marijuana, disturbing the peace (amended from battery), 
and misdemeanor domestic battery. (5/11/12 PSI, p.4.) 
Hathaway has also demonstrated that he is not amendable to treatment, 
and thus not a candidate for an earlier release from his incarceration or from his 
supervision requirements. Hathaway was removed from the Harbor House 
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program after he violated house rules, refused opportunities for work, and acted 
in a rude and disrespectful manner towards other house residents. (R., p.145.) 
Hathaway was also dropped from the Integrity Therapeutic Services and Bell 
Counseling programs after failing to appear for appointments. (R., pp.146-147.) 
The district court reasonably determined Hathaway was no longer a viable 
candidate for community supervision and that no reduction in Hathaway's 
sentence was appropriate. Hathaway's demonstrated inability or unwillingness to 
comply with the law and the terms of his probation did not entitle him to a 
reduction of his underlying sentence. Hathaway has failed to establish that his 
sentence as imposed is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the sentence imposed 
upon the district court's revocation of Hathaway's probation. 
DATED this 17th day of April, 2013. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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